Introduction
In a recent Note in this Journal, Mooney, Hall, Donaldson and Gerard (1991) -hereafter MHDG -argue that almost all empirical work by economists on equity in the delivery of health care is misguided, because it is based on an inappropriate notion of equity: that persons m equal need of health care should be treated the same. The appropriate notion, argue MHDG, is that of 'equality of access'.
What do policy-makers really think?
One of MHDG's arguments is that equity goals in policy documents are almost always couched in terms of access rather than utilisation. As anyone who has consulted policy documents in this area knows, the picture is typically far murkier than MHDG imply. Le Grand (1982) , for example, has argued convincingly that some British policy documents seem to imply a commttment to equahty of treatment for those m equal need; others a commitment to equality of access; yet others a commrtment to equality of health Such ambivalence 1s not confined to Bntam. the same is true of several other OECD countries [van Doorslaer, Wagstaff and Rutten (1992) ] and, one suspects, of at least some of the non-OECD countries m MHDG's 11st.
Part of this ambivalence reflects, we conjecture, the fact that the drstmctton between 'access' and 'utihsation' which MHDG make, whilst perfectly logical, 1s less sharp m the minds of policy-makers than MHDG would have us believe The notion of 'access', they argue, refers to the opportunities open to people and 1s best thought of m terms of the costs people incur m using health services. It 1s self-evident that even d everyone enloys the same access to health care (1.e face the same costs of securing care), persons m equal need may end up consummg different amounts of care (and types of care), simply because then demand curves differ. That policy-makers who have been successful m ehmmatmg mequahties m access would regard such demand-led differences m utthsatron as of no consequence, as MHDG Imply, is far from self-evident. We conlecture that policy-makers would want to know the resons for the differing demand curves before they make their ludgement We suspect that differences in demand curves that are attnbutable to differences m income would certainly be a matter for concern. MHDG might respond to this by saying that when they talk about 'costs', they mean costs m utility terms rather than m money terms, to the extent that differences m income are reflected m differences m the marginal utthty of income, differences m income would automattcally be picked up m their measure of access But what of differences m demand curves that reflect differences m educatton? Suppose that the poor have the same opportunities to receive preventive care as the rich, but have a lower take-up rate simply because they are not as well informed about health matters. Wouldn't pohcymakers be concerned7
We suspect they would. It is surely no accident that though policy-makers talk about access to health care, pohcy measures are typically defined m terms of health care itself Ironically, Mooney and McGuire (1988) themselves put the point rather well In the context of a discussion of RAWP m Britain, they remark 'The pomt 1s that equity, as associated with government dtstrtbutlve pohctes, 1s not about equality of output with regard to health care. Ostensrbly, it IS concerned with equality of opportunity. Yet m reality, given the problem of reconcthng expenditure with opportunity, the policy 1s largely concerned with equality of inputs, albeit weighted by some proxy of need' (p. 74, italics added.) Is the switch from access to health care itself really because of 'the problem of reconcilmg expenditure with opportunity' (whatever that may mean), or because policy-makers really mean 'health care' despite the fact they say 'access'? We conlecture the latter.
It 1s also surely no accident that academics on both sides of the Atlantic who have set out to examme 'access' have without exception actually examined 'utllisatlon'.' It may well be that Mooney (1983) is right:: the authors of these studies are simply confused. But how can such confusion have persisted for so long? And amongst such eminent researchers? The list includes, after all, Rudolph Klein, a well-respected British social pohcy analyst, and Karen Davis, the American economist and former adviser to President Carter. At a recent conference on equity m health care orgamsed around an ongoing EC comparative project,' Davis had a simple explanation of why the American research group preferred to refer to its study as a study of equality of access even though its methods were basically those outlined in Wagstaff, van Doorslaer and Pacl (1991) m the United States there is and never has been any distmctlon drawn between the two concepts.
3. Assessing the 'superiority' of rival distributive principles But MHDG do not rest then case just on what pohcy-makers appear to think. They also offer some arguments of principle as to why, in their view, equality of access 1s 'superior' to 'equal treatment for equal need'. There 1s some unhappy mixmg of positive and normative propositions m their list on p. 478, but the @st of their argument seems to be this to insist on equal treatment for equal need m the presence of different demand functions implies that mdlvlduals' preferences are to be ignored m health care, that medical practices for gven conditions would have to be standardlsed, and that uniform comphance would have to be enforced. MHDG's obJection to all of this is that Ignoring preferences implies acceptance of the view that health care 1s a merit good and this would constitute 'a radical departure from traditional welfare economics'. They proceed to examine what they claim to be the 'theoretical underpmnmgs of eqmty by exammmg various models of altrulstlc externality Models of externality are, it has to be said, a red herring. They say nothing about equity and distributive Justice. Nor do they purport to As one of us [Culyer (1980) ] argued long ago, there 1s a world of difference between what people regard as Just, and what they regard as desirable, even desirable to an altruist. The latter may depend on what they regard as just, but will certainly depend on their degree of compassion and on their economic situation. The whole point of making a Judgement about Justice IS, after all, to frame it in a way that it is a Judgement made mdepeudently of the interests of the person makmg it. That is precisely why Rawls (1972) and 'See, for example, Salkever (1975) , Collms and Klein (1980), and PulFer (1986) 'Cf van Doorslaer, Wagstaff and Rutten (1992) phtlosophers since him have been so attached to the notion of the 'vet1 of ignorance', despite all its shortcomings.
But what is especially surprising is MHDG's apparent belief that because the notion of 'equal treatment for equal need' implies a departure from welfare economics, tt must automatically be inferior to the notion of 'equality of access' -a notion that doesn't imply such a departure. This view 1s particularly surprtsmg m view of the importance MHDG attach to the revealed preferences of policy-makers. If there is one revealed preference 'expertment' in health care whose results are unequivocal, tt is surely this: that, by going to such great lengths to sever the link between ability to pay and receipt of health care, policy-makers m most OECD countries and many others have signalled their unequivocal rejection of the traditional Paretian value judgements m the context of health care [cf Williams (1976) ]. That 'equal treatment for equal need' is inconsistent with such value judgements may, therefore, actually be a point in its favour rather than one against it, for it is at least a candidate, if not the only one, for what might supersede the Paretian value judgements A more appropriate question, then, IS not 'Which distributive prmciple accords most closely to the value judgements of Paretian welfare economics7' but rather 'Which distributive principle appears to be considered most just? Glllon (1986) has considered the applicability of the vartous theories of social justtce to health care and concludes that of the various distributive principles 'dtstribution according to need' commands the greatest support amongst physicians and others working in the medical field.
'Equal treatment for equal need' also appears -at least on the face of itto be consistent with a rejection of another value judgement of traditional welfare economtcs. that social welfare depends on, and only on, the utility levels of the various mdtvtduals who together make up 'society'. Rejection of this 1s implied by the apparently widely held view amongst policy-makers that the busmess of health services is (primarily) improving health -a view that implies a commitment to what one of us [Culyer (1989) ] has termed 'extra-welfarism' rather than to the 'welfarism' of traditional welfare economics [Sen (1979) ]. Thts view is to be found m Britain, where Health Authorities m the NHS are now being charged with assessing the need for health care and of procuring appropriate packages of health care to meet these needs, as well as m the United States, where concern is frequently expressed about the failure to translate high per captta expenditures mto superior health outcomes
In the extra-welfarist view, health care is merely a means to an end (viz. tmprovmg health) and the ethical justification of favouring one means of distributing health care rather than another (e.g. distribution according to need) has to be sought m the ethical justification of the associated dtstribution of health. The same 1s true of access, which in this view 1s also a means to an end, the normative significance of which is that it enables people to receive health care, which in turn improves their health. Opting for one method of determming access (such as giving everyone the same access, or determining access in line with need) can also therefore be defended only m terms of the ethical justification of the final distribution of health it gives rise to.
Adoption of the extra-welfare stance thus commits researchers to analysmg the fairness and efficiency of alternative distributional rules in terms of their implications for the distribution of the entity m which policy-makers are ultimately interested (which is, we conjecture, health), rather than in terms of how well the rules square with an inappropriate set of value judgements underlying modern welfare economics. Since it seems hard to justify aiming at a distribution of health other than equality (indeed the case for 'distribution according to need' seems usually to have been that its adoption promotes equality), the analysis from an equity standpoint must inevitably involve asking the question 'Which prmciple is most consistent with the pursuit of equality of health?. Clearly such an analysis requires a precise defimtion of 'need', as well as an appropriate analytical framework. Elsewhere two of us [Culyer and Wagstaff (1991) ] have sought to do just this: we have suggested that need is best deftned as the amount of medical care expenditures required to reduce a person's capacity to benefit to zero. If this is accepted, it can be quite easily demonstrated, however, that distributmg medical care expenditures according to need is, m general, unlzkely to promote equality of health and may well tncrease inequality. So, although being m need remains a necessary condition for the receipt of health care in an equitable system, allocation proportionately to need is neither necessary nor sufficient for equity m the distribution of health care
Of course, the empirical literature that purports to examine 'equal treatment for equal need' does not m practice do this. Rather it seeks to establish the extent to which persons m equal health are treated similarly, which is a different principle from both equality of access and 'equal treatment for equal need. But unless the scope for improvmg health via the application of medical expenditures is the same for the individuals concerned, the promotion of equality of health will require treating persons with the same health unequally
Where does this leave 'access'?
This does not mean, of course, that adoption of 'equality of access' will necessarily be more successful m promoting equality of health than either 'equal treatment for equal need' or 'equal treatment for equal health'. Indeed, enough has been said to make it clear that the problem with distributive principles such as 'distribution according to need' and 'distribution according to mittal health' 1s not that they entail dtscrimmatron amongst those who have gamed access to the health care sector, but rather that they discriminate mappropriately, failing to discriminate where they should, drscrimmating where they shouldn't, and not dtscrrmmatmg enough where discrimination is required. Whilst 'equality of access' 1s almost certainly required in order that needs can be assessed, it is clear that rt IS not, m an extra-welfarist world, a sufjicient distributive principle Nor, indeed, IS rt a necessary principle m decisions concerning who should get what once needs have been assessed. Thus whilst we would not disagree with MHDG that measuring equality of access 1s an important item on the research agenda m this area, we would strongly disagree that such research IS all that IS required
